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Patients participating in the shared benefits of publicly funded health care enjoy the benefits of treatments
tested on previous patients. Future patients similarly depend on treatments tested on present patients. Since
properly designed research assumes that the treatments being studied are—so far as is known at the
outset—equivalent in therapeutic value, no one is clinically disadvantaged merely by taking part in
research, provided the research involves administering active treatments to all participants. This paper
argues that, because no other practical or moral considerations count decisively against so doing, we
could and should oblige patients to agree to receive indicated treatment within the terms of any concurrent
research protocols. This ensures their treatment will benefit not only themselves but also future patients
through contributing to new knowledge. By analogy with the paying of income tax, patients should not be
allowed to ‘‘veto’’ their social responsibility to take part in clinical research.
S
o called ‘‘modest proposals’’, those disarming challenges
to our ability to say exactly what is wrong with an
obnoxious conclusion, have a distinguished history,1
high visibility,2 contemporary relevance in this journal,3 and
a tendency to backfire. Defoe found himself imprisoned; see
Daniel Defoe: the Life and Strange Surprising Adventures by R West
for an account of the personal consequences to Defoe of his
satirical pamphlet, The Shortest Way with Dissenters.4 In my case
the trouble so far has been embarrassment rather than
anything worse, but the urge to confess is a powerful one.
Initially I put forward the following argument in the
context of postgraduate teaching rather than of research as
such, still less policy discussion. The argument was a device
to provoke students into attacking its conclusion from the
now orthodox outraged defence of patient autonomy.
Unfortunately, in putting it forward, and buttressing it
against the more elementary objections that were to be
anticipated, I found myself reluctantly sustaining, defending,
and finally succumbing to it. Here is the initial argument in
its simplest form:
THE ARGUMENT IN SHORT FORM
In taking advantage of publicly funded health care, more or
less free at the point of use, and consisting in more or less the
best standardly available treatment for my presenting
condition, I am receiving treatments that have been brought
to their present state of perfection by having been tried out
on other people first. In effect, I stand on the shoulders of
patients who took part in past research. Do I not therefore
have an obligation to bear the feet of future patients by
allowing my treatment to be included in systematic research?
And should I not therefore give up (or have removed from
me) the veto that I currently enjoy over my own participation
in relevant clinical research?
This is a sort of ‘‘fair’s fair’’ argument—’’be done by as you
did’’, ‘‘don’t hand it out if you can’t take it’’ (or, more strictly
in this case, ‘‘don’t take it if you can’t hand it out’’).
The objections to the argument as I have presented it here
are likely to be vehement, and to centre on (if not entirely
consist in) emphatic assertions of the moral centrality of consent
to any ethically acceptable clinical research. In the past I have
lodged such objections myself, and believed them.5 Now,
however, and somewhat to my own dismay, I think they can
be met, as I will try to show in what follows.
LIMITS UPON CONSENT—AN ANALOGY WITH
INCOME TAX
First let us test the water with an analogy, which aims to
bring out the costs of voluntarism and (by implication) the
benefits of compulsion.
Consider the payment of income tax. We all know that
income tax isn’t voluntary—and furthermore we all know
that it could not be voluntary, and that the individual taxpayer
could not be granted a veto over his/her participation in the
scheme of redistributive taxation without risking a collapse
of that scheme as a whole. Collectively we cannot afford
such a collapse, for it would bring with it a concomitant
collapse in things for which the scheme pays—the running
of our civic institutions, our public services, our national
and local amenities and infrastructure, and indeed law and
order.
Thus the enforced payment of income tax is among other
things the enforced adoption of a pooled risk, pooled benefit,
communitarian commitment to a more or less decently
ordered society—something we all want to have, whether or
not we want to pay the tax. If we left taxation to the
volunteers there might well be a sizeable minority of
voluntary taxpayers bailing out the rest of us through a
meagre skeletal system of civic institutions and services. But
it would be a poor and a fragile alternative to the enforced
system we actually (albeit grudgingly) tolerate.
Well, in the same way, don’t we all want the best possi-
ble medical treatments, arrived at in the shortest possible
time by the most rapid and muscular system of clinical
research that is possible? Certainly, yes: I will take it as
axiomatic that we do. But now consider what follows from
the analogy so far: the current voluntary system no doubt
enables some advances to be made at some sort of pace, but
it is hardly the wholesale acceleration we might expect if
the whole system were to be put on what we might call a
‘‘war footing’’. A system of obligatory participation in clini-
cal research (albeit judiciously and compassionately regu-
lated) would provide both speed and muscle. The relatively
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swift advance in the treatment of childhood rather than
adult cancers owes much to the greater availability of a
pool of research subjects—that is, very young children, sick or
dying, whose participation in research is sanctioned pre-
dominantly by desperate parents—when compared with the
available numbers of consenting adult volunteers (R Evans,
personal communication, 1994).
Now of course there might be many things that we morally
ought to do—reduce our individual consumption of the
world’s energy and resources, give money for overseas aid,
enrol in first aid training, open our homes at Christmas time
to those living on the streets, and so forth—yet which we
would regard it as intolerable if society enforced our doing.
Indeed, the enforcement of all moral duties would risk
incoherence as a general principle, because it would empty our
behaviour of the voluntarism that is a conceptually necessary
part of most moral action. The point about the analogy with
income tax is that participation in some institutions is, or
ought to be, conditional: the benefits which those institutions
offer come at a price. We cannot run society well without the
coerciveness implicit in income tax. The analogy invites us to
consider the development of new medical treatments in the
same light.
But does the analogy work? In arguing that it does, I will
consider seven specific objections to it showing that they are
fatal neither individually nor in combination. The implica-
tions of the analogy’s success will then be summarised
starkly at the end of the paper. First, the objections as
follows:
OBJECTION (1): YOUR BODY IS NOT YOUR MONEY
A standard response to any attempted analogy is to deny that
the analogy fits. So it might be objected here that an
argument that works for income tax is one thing, but has no
necessary application to something so different from our
money as our very bodies and our bodily integrity. Your body
(or your health) is not remotely the same sort of thing as your
money (or any other of your worldly goods). If you like, it is
one thing to pool our funds and quite another thing to pool
our physiologies, the latter making no sense practically,
metaphysically, or morally.
On the face of it there is some substance to this objection.
We make both legal and moral distinctions between cash and
corpus, and have specific constraints if not outright bans on
the selling of body tissues, parts or—how shall I put this?—
services.
But we need not give up the argument at this point. These
constraints are placed by the state, and they can be altered or
redirected or refocused by the state. They may concern
primarily, even exclusively, the risks of unregulated private or
commercial bodily transactions, and they may have no
intended bearing on state sponsored transactions. My
proposal is not at all about the sort of things that normally
attract commercial transactions. It concerns putting aspects
of my body’s function temporarily at the service of the
common good, a good in which I ordinarily share, and (as
will be seen) doing so in a way that is fair, scrupulous, and
relatively safe.
In that crucial respect, then, it certainly does resemble
income tax as a way of putting private charitable—or for that
matter uncharitable—transactions into the public arena
where they can be conducted fairly and to the good of all:
that is the whole point of redistributive taxation and the fair
sharing of resources that it makes possible. Thus the analogy
cannot simply be denied or dismissed.
Formal resemblance is not enough, of course. Objectors
might concede the formal analogy but complain that its
implications ought not seriously to be embraced because of
other constraints. Objections (2) to (6) inclusive embody
complaints of this kind, as follows.
OBJECTION (2): RESEARCH IS RISKY
The objection we might now turn to is that research carries
the sort of uncertainties, or put more unsympathetically the
risk of harms, which are unacceptable within the normal
expectations of the clinical encounter. After all, when you go
to see your doctor you expect that she/he will arrange advice
and treatment specific to you and specifically in your
interests, and you certainly don’t expect that this will be
done in the interests of generating useful knowledge. If you
volunteer for research, that’s your business—but not the
business of the doctor or society more generally. She might
sometimes invite you to contemplate the risks of entering
research, but she should never expect or require it. Entering
clinical research is risky in a way in which paying income tax
can never be (however painful the deductions that appear in
one’s monthly payslip).
But this objection is naive. It completely ignores the facts
of life about the clinical encounter. It ignores the uncomfor-
table truth that, from the moment you step into the
consulting room, you have already entered the research
context on at least two counts.
First, you are inevitably a beneficiary of previous
research—which is being applied to you, courtesy of those
patients who were your predecessors. Second, all clinical
interventions are also experiments upon a study population
of n=1, simply because your actual response to a treatment is
unknowable in advance of trying it out. The minute you
invite your doctor to treat you then you have volunteered for
an experiment, and you must accept the risks this involves
even in the ordinary clinical context.
And what, in any case, are the harms specifically at stake
when you are enrolled into a clinical trial? It is a standard
ethical requirement of research that it should involve harms,
which—so far as we know at the outset of the trial—are
neither more grievous nor more likely than those attaching to
the usual standard treatment. This conception of ‘‘minimal
harm’’ is a proper expectation normally attaching to any
ethically appropriate experiment such as a randomised
controlled trial (RCT). It may of course emerge during the
trial that a particular treatment is specifically harmful to
particular individuals. In properly conducted research such
‘‘adverse events’’ are monitored and, if serious, taken as
grounds for intervening—if necessary withdrawing the
individual from the trial in order to place them on better
tolerated or more effective treatment.
What’s more, the culpable treatment need not be the new
treatment that is being tested experimentally—it may as
easily be the standard treatment against which the new
treatment is being compared. It may be that we discover that
the current standard treatment is no good for you—and we
may discover this either in the individual, ‘‘n=1’’, experiment
of ordinary clinical treatment, or in the large scale controlled
clinical trial. From your point of view, what counts is that we
keep a close eye on you and change your treatment if it
appears right to do so.
OBJECTION (3): RESEARCH DEFIES YOUR
EXPECTATIONS OF TREATMENT
Our hypothetical opponent will not give up on this point,
however, going on to complain that much research is not
about treatment but concerns diagnostic methods or techni-
ques, or epidemiological data gathering that cannot possibly
offer you the benefits of treatment.
Let me concede this straightaway, and deal with it by
refining and limiting my proposal accordingly. First, I will
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limit my proposal to only that research that happens to
involve administering to you a treatment that you need in the
management of a condition for which you have actively
sought advice. In other words, during the course of a normal
clinical encounter you are prescribed treatment, which is
indicated for your condition but in which there happens also
to be legitimate current research interest. The usual reason
for this is the perennially provisional and uncertain nature of
current medical knowledge—medicine can do so much for
you now, but preferably would be able to do far more for you
in the future given the necessary research. (As proof of this,
look at how much less medicine was able to do for
comparable patients in the past.)
We can, and should, refine the proposal still further. Let us
for the time being countenance only those experimental
methods in which all patients—including you—are certain to
receive an active, indicated treatment, regardless of the
‘‘arm’’ of the experiment to which you are allocated. Now
recall the expectations you have on presenting at the doctor’s
surgery. You expect—don’t you?—to get the best available
treatment for your condition. Well, under this proposal, you
will.
For the expectations that drive any ethically acceptable
research are, standardly, that the subjects entering the trial
will receive treatment that is—for all we know—at least as
good as the standard treatment. This is the meaning of
‘‘clinical equipoise’’, and it is normally an intellectual as well
as an ethical requirement of any research that is genuinely
worthy of the name.6 Let us be in no doubt about this:
genuine professional uncertainty about the merits of differ-
ent treatments is normally an absolute requirement for
proceeding in research. Were this requirement not fulfilled it
would be because clinicians already knew or strongly
suspected which treatment was preferable. In such circum-
stances they ought obviously to prescribe the preferred
treatment: clearly it would be specifically unethical to test
an insubstantial or, worse, redundant question upon the
bodies of patients.
Let me spell out what this implies.
Remember that when you present to your doctor, you
expect to—and indeed normally will—receive the standard
best available treatment. This is true of ordinary clinical
treatment outside the context of a clinical trial. But it remains
equally true within the context of genuine research predicated
upon genuine uncertainty. Suppose that treatment for your
clinical condition is being investigated in a clinical trial com-
paring the best current standard with an alternative treat-
ment (which may be a different substance or simply different
formulations or dose regimes of the same substance). You
may get the current standard treatment; you may get
something new or different. But in the genuine uncertainty,
which is a prerequisite of ethically sound research, it doesn’t
matter at the outset which treatment you get—we are
logically bound to presume that there is no therapeutically
relevant difference between them, and the clinical trial is
being undertaken to test that very presumption.
Now it is true, as we’ve already acknowledged, that the
primary objective of ordinary clinical treatment is the
individual benefit of the patient, whereas the primary
objective of medical (or any other) research is the generation
of new knowledge and/or the reduction of future uncertainty.
But these objectives are not incompatible, and whilst patients
do not benefit from taking part in research as such neither are
they disbarred from the benefits of treatment simply by taking
part in research that involves treatment. In particular, if the
ethical requirements of an RCT as noted previously are met,
then your ability to benefit from treatments you will receive
is totally unaffected.
I think we have now disposed of objections concerning
systematic differences in the probable harms and benefits of
treatments allocated in the two contexts we are consider-
ing—that is, routine clinical treatment and controlled clinical
trials—when viewed at the point at which patients are
enrolled in the trials. And if systematic differences emerge in
the course of the trial (something the trial is far better
designed to uncover than is the hurly burly of routine clinical
practice, after all) then we can swiftly adjust your treatment
on a properly informed basis.
There still remain, however, two further significant
differences between standard clinical treatment and clinical
research in the form of a RCT as described here. These are,
first, that the choice of treatment in the former is made by
the prescribing physician and in the latter is made by a
computer-generated random number sequence; and, second,
that for the period of the trial the patient and his physician
may not know exactly which treatment he is receiving.
Let us deal with these matters separately, as we consider
our interlocutor’s next two objections.
OBJECTION (4): INDIVIDUAL CLINICAL JUDGMENT
IS PARAMOUNT
Next, then, we face the objection that it is somehow wrong or
unacceptable in the ordinary clinical encounter to substitute
a random treatment allocation process for individual clinical
judgment, because, among other things, the clinical relation-
ship is above all a personal and not a mechanical one.
Yet this substitution can hardly be a disadvantage if we are
to take seriously the intellectual basis of the RCT, which is
that the accumulation of properly controlled experimental
data is respectable—because generalisable—in a way in which
anecdotal evidence can never be. (We may leave aside the
virtues of empathic interpersonal communication between
doctor and patient, because they should remain intact and
unaffected by the simple engagement of a research protocol
with the matter of allocating treatment in a situation of
genuine uncertainty.) Where the efficacy of a specific
treatment is concerned the individual and personal prefer-
ences of the individual physician are of no especial weight
compared with the collective evidence available to the
relevant clinical community. Where genuine clinical uncer-
tainty obtains—and, to repeat, this should be an absolute
requirement for any ethically appropriate research—then the
‘‘hunch’’ of the prescribing physician is frankly neither here
nor there. Therefore the official position of evidence-based
biomedicine includes the following implication: namely that
a patient whose treatment is the subject of legitimate
research is not, and logically cannot be, disadvantaged just
because his treatment is allocated randomly, and not hand
picked for him by his attending physician. In any situation of
genuine uncertainty, and until (subsequent to the trial) we
know more, the random sequencer is allocating therapeuti-
cally equivalent treatments, all of them presumed to be as
good as the best current standard.
OBJECTION (5): WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION
IS UNACCEPTABLE
The remaining significant difference between the RCT and
the standard clinical consultation concerns what information
is known by either the patient or his own doctor. In the usual
clinical context the doctor chooses the treatment, and tells
the patient what she is prescribing to him, and in an
outpatient setting the patient may even go and obtain it
himself at the pharmacy. By contrast, in the RCT there are
usually good reasons why the patient and even his doctor
should not know exactly which treatment he is getting, at
least until after the trial.
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Well, what of it? Just what’s in a name? Less, I think, than
the mock affection noted by James Agate in his diary (9th
April 1937) following a visit to Thorpe Bay without his
antiasthma medication:
I just can’t bear to run short of
Acetylmethyldimethylamoxidiphenyalhydrazine.7
We can immediately dispose of one reason for needing to
know the identity of the treatment, that is, to avoid
predictable adverse reactions on the part of a given patient.
Clinical trials have inclusion and exclusion criteria for very
good reasons. These screen out people whose histories
suggest special sensitivity to particular groups of drugs or
other good reasons to avoid contact with them. So provided
the inclusion and exclusion criteria for our RCT are genuinely
fulfilled, we can assume that you as the enrolled patient are
not especially at risk from any of the treatment regimes in the
trial—and remember that you were going to receive one of
these treatments in any case. Ordinarily, having excluded
specific allergies or intolerances, do you really care about
whether you are receiving molecule A or molecule B? Exactly
what premium do you (or may you) put on being given a
chemical name that you may not necessarily wish even to
attempt to pronounce?
Your doctor may be profoundly interested, of course. But
provided that—as any ethically appropriate trial protocol
must provide—the ‘‘blinding’’ of treatment allocation can
instantly be reversed in case of an adverse event, no clinical
material disadvantage to you seems to follow from your
doctor being temporarily and provisionally denied this
knowledge. Of course, a certain autonomy is lost when
knowledge is even temporarily withheld. But this is a pretty
thin, theoretical sense of ‘‘autonomy’’, which I doubt you
would ordinarily want to exercise. The loss is substantial if
and only if you would ordinarily value precisely that
knowledge for its own sake. This seems, to say the least,
unlikely in your own case—or in mine. And I think it is
unlikely in your doctor’s case, either, if the return on this
‘‘investment’’ of temporary ignorance is to be her/his
improved ability to treat you in the future.
Furthermore, even if you do mind this provisional
ignorance, I suggest that it is simply one small part of the
legitimate price you are occasionally asked to pay for access to
the benefits of a pooled risk, pooled benefit, collectively
funded health care system. And it is indeed only an
occasional matter: it is unlikely that many treatment
prescriptions you receive will be provided under a trial
protocol even under the ‘‘pooling’’ system I am contemplat-
ing. There are, among other things, simply not enough
researchers, funding, or energy to bring every clinical
interaction under such protocols, though the more over-
worked of our research ethics committees could perhaps be
forgiven for doubting me on this point.
The position we have now reached is this. As a patient, you
simply are no worse off in a clinical trial: the trial costs you
nothing. Notoriously you will receive, if anything, closer
clinical attention in the trial than outside it, and because this
attention is something generally sought by patients it is
plausibly a net gain for you when enrolled as a trial subject.
And medical research is of course the better for including
you—always supposing you meet the inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the trial.
Thus the costs of my proposal so far are only that you have
had a right of veto taken away from you. What sort of a cost
this is, and how weighty, we shall think about next. But it
will have to be extremely weighty to overcome both the loss
of the advantages listed here and the context of obligation
that is at the heart of the argument with which I started—the
argument that as a patient receiving treatment you already
stand on the shoulders of past research subjects, and future
patients need to stand on yours.
OBJECTION (6): MOST CANNOT OPT OUT OF ‘‘THE
DEAL’’
We now find ourselves facing a larger point concerning the
transparency of my ‘‘modest proposal’’. The proposal is, to
recall, that you lose your current right of veto over
participation in appropriate clinical research in exchange
for your access to a system of publicly funded health care free
at the point of use. When you need treatment, and moreover
if—and only if—that treatment is the subject of ongoing
research, then the prescribing, administering, and monitor-
ing of that treatment will be arranged within the terms of the
research protocol. And if—and only if—you want to take
advantage of that treatment, then you do so with your eyes
open. You know in advance that your particular treatment
will be decided and appraised within a trial protocol.
Having decided to opt into such a system (or, perhaps to
stay in it) then whether you are treated in a given
circumstance will not depend on whether a relevant trial is
going on at the time. You will always be treated, if you wish
to be treated. It is simply that if a trial is indeed going on,
then your treatment will be arranged within, and will
contribute to, the trial. And your treatment in the trial will
(to repeat) be at least as good as the current standard
treatment available to you in any case, so far as the relevant
clinical community can tell at the time of enrolling you;
any emergent deficits will be made good as they become
known.
But now you might protest that you never actually opted
into such a publicly funded system at all—you never ‘‘bought
into the deal’’, but simply found yourself in it. (This is most
obviously true of patients who were born and bred in a
society that supports such a publicly funded system, rather
than those who immigrated into one.) So if you didn’t opt in,
can you opt out—for instance, on the grounds that you
disliked the terms of my pooled research proposal, if it had
been implemented?
Well, of course you can, if you are prepared to pay for
private health care. In buying your way out of making one
kind of contribution to publicly funded health care (your
physical participation in research) you at least forfeit the
right to take up the benefits of others’ contributions free of
charge. Whether your actual monetary payments for private
health care directly benefit the publicly funded system is no
doubt disputable; this takes us into the detailed analysis of a
mixed health care economy—something which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Certainly, opting out economically may
not be at all the same thing as absolving yourself from any
moral responsibility to contribute to participation in medical
research.
But, more immediately, suppose that you cannot afford to
do anything other than opt in or stay in the publicly funded
system. To be brutally honest I think this simply means that,
because like all of us you stand on the shoulders of previous
public health care patients, you cannot afford to do anything
other than be willing to support the feet of future public
health care patients. In much the same way—to return to my
opening analogy—few of us can afford to buy our way out of
paying income tax by retreating to a tax haven and then
paying directly for the services and institutions that everyone
else obtains through participation in a non-voluntary taxa-
tion system. I should perhaps make it clear that I personally
do not hold private medical insurance or have any other
arrangements of access to private health care. The con-
sequences of this ‘‘modest proposal’’ therefore also apply to
me personally.
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There are, in short, some things that you can veto and
some things that you cannot veto. And this is one of the
things that—suggests my modest proposal—you cannot veto
unless your income allows it.
Now admittedly this last consideration sounds rather
dismissive, even contemptuous of the general lack of choices
facing those who cannot afford to buy their way out of the
constraints of publicly funded services: and that means most
of us, of course. Accordingly this brings me to consider one
final, serious, objection of a general kind, as follows.
OBJECTION (7): THE LESSONS OF HISTORY, OR THE
‘‘SLIPPERY SLOPE’’
Now it is precisely those people who cannot afford to make
choices like these who are the most vulnerable. Modern
history—since, shall we say, 1930—has shown their vulner-
ability to be in need of special protection, special rights, and
special exemptions. And in general I would support the
motives underlying these protections. But does this mean
that modern history also demonstrates a special, privileged
place for voluntarism and consent in the specific context of
medical research—as, perhaps, the circumstances leading
ultimately to the Declaration of Helsinki might suggest? (I
owe this objection to Steven Edwards.) Does it indicate a line
that simply cannot be crossed?
This is a serious objection, but notice that it is not a
conceptual or logical objection to the principle of removing the
veto. It is a historical, accidental, contingent objection. It says
in effect that the special wrongs committed against some
patients or pseudo patients (‘‘patients’’ is hardly a tolerable
name for concentration camp prisoners) in the name of
medical experimentation have been so heinous, so wide-
spread, and so disgusting that they call for special sensitiv-
ities and especially solid protections. If we override any of
those protections now—as we apparently might if we
adopted my proposal—then we are on a slippery slope
leading to crimes against humanity.
This is a strong objection or, at least, strongly worded. Of
course I agree with the political sentiments behind it—but I
do not admit it as an historically plausible objection to my
proposal. Since it has a historical content it can be answered
historically. Or, rather, we can insist that the objection must
be judged in historical terms. In particular anyone relying on
it must show that the circumstances of, say, a pooled research
national health service are in relevant ways so sufficiently
similar to those that produced past atrocities as to make
those very atrocities the author of our present rules.
But it seems clear that the circumstances are not remotely
similar. No one who was a victim of them ‘‘bought in’’ to the
general circumstances of the Nazi death camps. There was no
‘‘deal’’ involving reciprocal advantages, which would be
waived if the costs were waived. The circumstances of what
passed for medical care in the camps themselves bear no
resemblance to the modern day National Health Service
(NHS) as it operates in the UK today. The motives and
methods (and indeed in many instances the scientific
conceptions) of those undertaking the Nazi experiments
were in the main diametrically opposite to the motives and
methods in contemporary medical research. To doubt this is
to impugn the entire basis on which we as patients voluntarily
avail ourselves of current treatments, as well as to vilify those
who develop and provide them—the very people whom we
voluntarily consult as our doctors. Indeed it could be said that
basing our regulation of the actions of contemporary medical
researchers even in part on our repudiation of the Nazi
butchers is to begin to impugn and to vilify, if only implicitly,
our own medical research community. In a rather similar
way, to tailor the governance of general practitioners towards
the attempted prevention of another Harold Shipman is,
implicitly, to put all general practitioners within walking
distance of the dock in which Shipman stood arraigned.
Public overreaction to a genuine scandal can itself be
scandalous in its consequences.8
CONCLUSION
I think I have shown that all these objections fail. If there are
others that are more effective, I will be glad to learn of
them—not least because I myself find the ‘‘modest proposal’’
as disconcerting as it is seemingly irresistible. If there are no
effective objections, then I think my modest proposal must
succeed—and that when you next consult your doctor you
should join me in calling for the removal of the patient’s veto
over entry into clinical research, and (of course) should waive
the veto yourself at the first opportunity.
When I put it in those terms, even if you agree with my
arguments, you may none the less recoil again from what it
sounds as if I might be proposing. So let me finish by
emphasising once again just how limited a proposal it really
is. I am proposing nothing more than the following:
If (1) you go to your doctor in search of treatment,
and if (2) you are prescribed a type of treatment, which
your doctor competently judges that you need or from
which you could benefit,
and if (3) that type of treatment happens to be the subject
of ongoing clinical research in a context of genuine
equipoise (clinical uncertainty about which is the best
available treatment),
and if (4) you meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria for
entry into the relevant trial,
and if (5) that trial is so designed that everyone enrolled in
it will receive some active treatment or other whose relative
merits are genuinely unknown and thus sincerely assumed
to be equivalent when you enter the trial
THEN I think it is your duty as a beneficiary of the pooled
cost, pooled benefit NHS system to do for future patients
exactly what past patients have done for you—that is, you
must receive the treatment within the parameters of the
clinical trial in question.
It is, in sum, your duty to take part as a subject in research,
which can lead to the improvement of future treatments. In
properly scrutinised and properly monitored research, there is
no basis for fearing that any harm will come to you from the
taking part. Much good may, and hopefully will, come to
others.
And because not everyone can be relied on to do their duty,
in clinical research any more than in contributing to
nationally shared welfare, then responsibility for the decision
must be given to others. You should be entered into the
research automatically, and if you want to obtain treatment
in these circumstances then you should no more have a veto
over taking part in the research than you should have a veto
over paying your income tax.
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